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Abstract—Illegal insider trading of stocks is based on
releasing non-public information (e.g., new product launch,
quarterly financial report, acquisition or merger plan) before
the information is made public. Detecting illegal insider trading
is difficult due to the complex, nonlinear, and non-stationary
nature of the stock market. In this work, we present an
approach that detects and predicts illegal insider trading
proactively from large heterogeneous sources of structured
and unstructured data using a deep-learning based approach
combined with discrete signal processing on the time series
data. In addition, we use a tree-based approach that visualizes
events and actions to aid analysts in their understanding of
large amounts of unstructured data. Using existing data, we
have discovered that our approach has a good success rate in
detecting illegal insider trading patterns.
Keywords-Stock Market; Neural Network; Natural Language
Processing; Time Series Prediction; Illegal Insider Trading;
I. INTRODUCTION
The stock market is a collection of markets and exchanges
where equities, bonds and other form of securities are
issued and traded. It provides companies access to capital
in exchange for a slice of ownership with the investors. The
largest stock exchange in the world is the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). NASDAQ is the second largest in the
U.S., where most of the tech companies participate. The
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the regulatory
body that oversees the U.S. stock market.
Securities fraud are deceptive activities in connection
with the offer and sale of the securities [1]. According
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report [2],
the following are the most prevalent types of fraud being
encountered today in the securities market: 1) Market Ma-
nipulation—creating an artificial buying pressure for some
usually low trading stock which is largely controlled by
the perpetrators. This results in an illicit gain to the per-
petrators and losses to the innocent and naive investors.
Market manipulation destroys the fair and orderly market,
2) Late Day Trading—illicit purchase or sale of securities
after regular market hours. This type of trading is restricted
due to important market influencing decisions are released
after the close of regular trading, 3) High Yield Investment
Fraud—the offering of low or no risk investments that
guarantee unusually high rates of return.
Insider trading in the stock market is trading based on
non-public information. Insider trading in the U.S. is a
profitable activity [3]. It can be both legal and illegal. A
legal insider trading needs to be done by following the
proper guideline of the regulatory. On the other hand, illegal
insider trading occurs when trading is performed based
on non-public (private, leaked, tipped) information (e.g.,
new product launch, quarterly financial status, acquisition
or merger plan) before the information is made public.
Illegal insider trading detection and correct prediction of
stock price are challenging problems. The traditional tech-
niques do not adequately address these problems. New ap-
proaches and techniques are required in order to understand
the complexity of a stock market. For instance, Artificial
Neural Network (ANN), an approach that is loosely modeled
after the neural structure of a mammalian cerebral cortex can
be useful in this regards. Neural Networks are organized into
layers of interconnected nodes. Patterns are represented by
a neural network via the input layers, which are connected
to one or more hidden layers. These layers end up with
the output layer where the result from the input pattern is
produced. However, regular neural networks do not work
well for time series or sequential data because they lack
memory (i.e., storage) of past events. As a result, a more
popular neural network technique is a Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN), where the output of a neuron is fed back
to the input of the neuron again. However, while that gives
some memory (limited and consecutive) to the neuron, it
still suffers from the vanishing/exploding gradient problem.
Furthermore, the learning rate of the network drops quickly
as gradient contribution from far away steps become zero.
On the other hand, Long Short-Term Memory Networks
(LSTM) overcome some of the problems of the RNN. Unlike
the feed-forward network, LSTM can keep any number of
the previous steps (as required) in the memory and forget
those when needed. It also helps to manage the memory in
a more controlled way—which information to keep, which
to update, which to forget, and which to pay attention
to over a longer period of time. And this is why LSTM
is very useful in time series prediction where the data
might have seasonality (cycle of behavior over time), noise
(variability in data that can’t be explained correctly with
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model) and trends (increasing or decreasing behavior over a
time period).
Contribution: Our primary contribution in this work is
the use of an LSTM RNN to predict stock volume for
some targeted companies and then using our proposed algo-
rithm ANOMALOUS, we will be able to detect anomalous
pattern in the predicted data that may be an effect of
an illegal insider trading. Other contributions are in the
data preprocessing stage: A) classification of illegal insider
trading cases from a huge number of litigation related press
releases (SEC litigation archives); B) implementation of a
tree-based approach that visualizes events and actions to
aid analysts in their understanding of large amounts of
unstructured data (e.g., litigation related press releases). Our
experimental results support that (1) it is possible to detect
illegal insider trading within a short period of time from a
mix of affected and non-affected companies, and (2) it is
possible to classify and intuitively visualize a large number
of unstructured data. Usually, investors become aware of
illegal insider trading when the SEC files cases—too late
for any actionable intelligence. Thus, what we are proposing
is a computational intelligence-based approach that analyzes
data from heterogeneous sources and detects potential illegal
insider trading activities long before the official news of that
information. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
comprehensive attempt to mine illegal insider trading from a
diverse source of data using computational intelligence, and
as such, limits our ability to comprehensively comparing our
proposed approach with other related work. In the following
sections, we present previous research on predicting stock
market manipulation. We then describe the dataset we used,
including the data preprocessing. We then include our exper-
iments, results, and analysis, followed by some concluding
observations and future work.
II. BACKGROUND
In the work of [4], the authors propose a Contextual
Anomaly Detection Approach (CAD) for complex time
series data of stock market. The anomaly detection approach
is treated here as a contextual or local outlier detection
approach based on the information that similar companies
tend to show similar behavior irrespective of the time of
the year. In this research, five groups of anomaly detection
methods are studied as follows: window based, proximity-
based, prediction based, Hidden Markov Model-based, and
segmentation based. All of them have their own advantages
and disadvantages. According to the author, none of them is
a perfect candidate for this type of time series based anomaly
detection. Rather they propose a Contextual Anomaly De-
tection approach which they found to outperform other state
of art approaches such as KNN and Random Walk. The
LSTM RNN that we are using in this work uses day-based,
window-based and entire-history based prediction.
Golmohammadi et al. [1] mention that existing fraud
detection approaches heavily rely on a set of rules based
on expert knowledge. However, the current stock market is
more dynamic in nature, where perpetrators are constantly
devising new schemes, so there is need of scalable machine
learning algorithms to identify market manipulation activi-
ties. They applied different types of machine learning algo-
rithms like Naive Bayes, SVM, CART, KNN, and Random
Forest. Empirical results show that Naive Bayes outperforms
other learning methods in terms of the F2 measure. The
work of [1] is actually an extension of the work of Diaz et
al. [5]. According to the authors, three techniques contribute
heavily to market manipulation: 1) Buying or selling stock at
the end of the day or last quarter to affect the closing price,
2) Wash trades (pre-arranged trades) that will be reversed
later or that has no actual risk to the seller or the buyer,
and 3) Cornering the market by obtaining a major portion
of stock. The dataset used in this work is the same one
as used in the work of Diaz et al. [5]. This dataset contains
the market manipulation cases reported by the SEC between
January and December of 2003, which includes 31 dissimilar
stocks, 8 manipulated stocks and 25 stocks similar to the
manipulated stocks. The dataset we use in our work contains
data from the beginning year (1996) of the litigation archive
to the year 2018, and our focus is narrowed to predicting
illegal insider trading—which is one of the more difficult
types of stock market fraud to detect and predict.
According to [6], stock market abuse can happen in three
primary ways: 1) Information-based manipulation, where fi-
nancial rumor is released to affect the price; 2) Action-based
manipulation, where equity supply/demand is squeezed to do
the manipulation; and 3) Trade-based manipulation, where
the manipulation is done simply by buying and selling,
which makes it difficult to categorize as illegal. Furthermore,
illegal insider trading mostly is done through buying and
selling which makes it difficult to detect or predict.
Moreover, price manipulation cannot be detected from an
event of a single action. Instead, most of the time it consists
of a series of actions and manipulation strategies evolving
over the time, where manipulation behaviors are not obvious
when mixed with a massive set of normal records. According
to [7] and [8] price manipulation can be accomplished in
many different forms. For instance, there is ramping or
gouging or momentum ignition, where the investor enters
a buy/sell order (sometimes called a “spoofing order”) at a
price which is much higher/lower than the actual bidding
or asking price, creating a false appearance of interest
followed by a “bona fide” order which is opposite of the
previous order. Another example is Pump & Dump, where
the manipulator makes a profit by a quick flipping of long-
held holding of shares at the manipulated price.
Diaz et al. [5] show that it is possible to discover
manipulation patterns from hourly transactional data using
knowledge discovery techniques. They adopt an open box
approach that uses heterogeneous sources such as news
sources, financial ratios, variables, etc., to describe trades
at an intraday (i.e., hourly) level. The dataset used in this
research is based on the stock market manipulation cases
pursued by the SEC, and is also the dataset that we will use
in our work.
In the work of Jia [9], the effectiveness of LSTM is
explored for stock price prediction. Though this research
has no connection with any type of fraud or manipulation
detection, it can still be categorized as a manipulation
detection process.
In the work of Song et al. [10], the authors propose
a general Coupled Behaviors Analysis (CBA) framework
for detecting group-based market manipulation by capturing
more comprehensive couplings. Groups of manipulators
collaborate with each other to manipulate the stock price,
which is a big challenge for stock market surveillance.
Their approach performs better than the previous benchmark
Coupled Hidden Markov Model (CHMM), and the main
reason for this performance was proper domain knowledge
among stocks.
In the work of Zaki et al. [11], they propose a linguistic-
based text mining approach to demonstrate the process of
extracting financial concepts (e.g., parties involved, jurisdic-
tion, financial gain by the fraudster) from SEC Litigation
Releases (LR). They use a financial ontology to capture fi-
nancial fraud concepts from the SEC litigation releases. This
helps financial analysts to understand different manipulation
patterns from the prosecuted cases. However, their work
has a limitation on the number of litigation cases studies.
Usually, the more litigation cases that can be studied, the
less skewed the outcome. On the other hand, we are using
a tree-based approach, which will aid analysts by filtering
the number of cases they need to examine. Moreover, our
proposed approach helps to mine potential illegal insider
trading in advance (i.e., prediction).
In the work of Mantere et al. [12], they present a hy-
pothetical case study of stock market manipulation using
cyberattacks together with false information disseminated
through social media so that the false news influences the
market in a favorable way.
So far we have found a variety of approaches for stock
market manipulation fraud detection. Some approaches are
based on peer group analysis, some are based on contextual
anomaly detection, some are based on linguistic-based text
mining, and some use financial ontology. There is very little
research in the area of detecting illegal insider trading in the
stock market. The work of [13] is based on insider trading
but the research just analyzes insider trading cases. To the
best of our knowledge, what we are proposing is a more
comprehensive approach detecting illegal insider trading. To
the best of our knowledge, due to the novelty of this work,
we will be unable to benchmark our work against other
approaches.
Figure 1. Flowchart of the proposed technique.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Proposed Technique
Figure 1 is the flowchart of the technique that we imple-
mented. In the beginning, we targeted companies (Figure
1, labeled as A) that were identified by our tree-based
visualizations (to be discussed later in this paper) and also
identified as prominent illegal insider trading cases by the
SEC. Then, we collected historical stock volume data from
Yahoo Finance [14] for the targeted companies. The start
date of the collected stock volume data is three months
earlier than the date fetched from the parsed case and press
release, when the insider learns the non-public information.
And the end date of the collected stock volume data is the
date when we performed these tests. We collected all day-
wise stock transaction volume for the targeted companies
within these start and end dates (Figure 1, labeled as B).
In pattern discovery stage (Figure 1, labeled as C), we
selected the windows (a window is a collection of transaction
volumes for 50 consecutive days) when the insider learns
the nonpublic information and did transactions according to
that. We found that, in most of the cases, the insiders do
the transaction within a very short time frame (one to two
days) of the learned nonpublic information. So, we selected
50 days of transaction volume for a targeted company in
such a way that the date when the insider learns the non-
public information is in the middle. Some of the companies
face illegal insider trading multiple times (e.g., Wells Fargo),
so we get multiple patterns (window) from those companies.
By this way, we generated all illegal insider trading patterns,
which are ground truth for our anomaly detection algorithm
ANOMALOUS.
Our next task is to predict stock volume (Figure 1, labeled
as B and C) for the targeted companies for a certain period
and pass the discovered patterns as a sliding window over
it to see the similarity. So, for the selected companies, we
apply LSTM RNN to the historical stock transaction volume
data using three different approaches:
1) predicting a future window of transaction volume (e.g.,
50 days), based on the previous window of transaction
volume,
2) predicting transaction volume of a day ahead based on
the previous window of transaction volume, and
3) predicting a future window of transaction volume,
based on all previous transaction volume data.
It is necessary to mention that, we define a window as
a collection of N consecutive days. In this work, we use a
window of size 50, which is the same window size used by
Jia et al. [9], albeit, the purpose of their work is to predict
stock prices using LSTM RNN, whereas, we are using
transaction volume data to predict stock market transaction
volume towards the prediction of illegal insider trading by
our proposed ANOMALOUS algorithm. By analyzing data,
we realize that in the case of illegal insider trading, the
transaction volume is a better candidate to consider for the
algorithm as the price of an S share might be much less or
more than S, but the transaction volume for S share is going
to be exactly S.
In addition, the output from LSTM RNN consists of
four types of discrete signals (time series): the actual data
(transaction volume), window wise predicted signal (trans-
action volume for next window), day wise predicted signal
(transaction volume for next day), and signal (transaction
volume for next window) based on the whole historical
data. For anomaly detection, we used normalized cross-
correlation that can measure the similarities between given
discrete signals with different time lags. We represent trans-
action volume of consecutive days as a discrete signal.
The generated four types of discrete signals and previously
generated illegal insider trading patterns are passed through
our proposed anomaly detection and prediction algorithm
(ANOMALOUS).We named it ANOMALOUS as it helps
to find Anomalous Signals (time series).
The parameters for the ANOMALOUS algorithm are C,
M, W, P, and Data. C defines the selected companies, M
defines the specific application (i.e., one of three techniques)
of LSTM RNN, W defines the number of windows, P is
the extracted pattern (i.e., ground truth) for illegal insider
cases, and Data is a multi-dimensional array representing
the predicted stock transaction volume data by the LSTM
RNN. The ANOMALOUS algorithm is presented below.
For each company c in C, and each specific way m in M
applications of LSTM RNN, and each window w in windows
W, signals are compared with illegal insider trading patterns
or anomalous patterns to discover how similar they are by
segmenting the whole time series into windows and further
dividing the windows into days. The predicted signals (out-
put of LSTM RNN) are compared with both actual signals
(actual stock transaction volume from historical data) and
fraudulent/anomalous signals/patterns (discovered illegal in-
sider trading pattern) using Normalized Cross Correlation
(NCC) which actually normalize the signals into the same
scale and then compare signals to see how strongly they are
correlated. In addition, the NCC measures the correlation of
two discrete signals by considering different day lags. Here
day lags refer to the knowledge that one of the discrete
signals has some missing value at the beginning/end of the
signal, as compared to the other signals. In other words, day
lags means the signals may not be exactly vertically aligned
with one another as there may be some gaps in days. The
three types of prediction techniques using LSTM RNN and
the detail of NCC are described in Section IV. Here is our
proposed anomaly detection algorithm that visualizes and
matches the predicted and actual time series with anomalous
time series patterns.
B. Data
The SEC releases all litigations brought by the commis-
sion in federal court on their website [15]. This includes all
types of stock market manipulation charges. In addition, the
SEC and FBI also publish some of the prominent illegal
insider trading cases and related press releases on their
website [16], [17]. These are the primary source of the
data for our research. We have written a Python-based web
crawler that crawls through litigation related press releases
archive starting from the beginning year 1996 to the current
year 2018 and downloads and stores them as plain text.
In total, we found 7988 cases, and out of that, 605 cases
have the keyword “insider” in the title of the release, 1142
cases have the keyword in the body of the release, 1222
cases have the keyword in either the title or body of the
release, and 525 cases have the keyword in both the title
and body of the release. So, roughly around 15% of the
total cases were illegal insider trading-related charges and
the remaining were other kinds of fraud-related charges.
Based on the keyword “insider”, we labeled all cases as
insider cases or non-insider cases. And then using that data,
we build a classifier for classifying available illegal insider
trading related documents, enabling us to classify future data
(e.g., social network posts). We also generated tree-based
visualizations for analysts to understand how a case falls
into the illegal insider trading category and the correlation
between events and actions. From the visualizations of actual
cases, we are able to drill down into the litigation releases
and retrieve relevant attributes (e.g., company name, illegal
insider name, the date when the insider learns the private
information, the date when it was public, and the volume
of illegal gains, etc.) (It should be noted that currently
this process is manual, and an automated solution will be
investigated as part of future work.).
Another source of data for this work is the historical stock
transaction volume (i.e., selected day-wise, transaction vol-
ume data for selected companies) data from Yahoo Finance
[14]. We collected thousands (14,842) of time series data
for the past few years (all that was available publicly at that
time) for the ten different companies for the experiments.
Out of the ten companies, nine involved in historical illegal
trading cases: Wells Fargo, BP plc, GTx, Oracle Corporation,
American Semiconductor Corporation, Spectrum Pharma-
ceuticals, Allscripts Healthcare Solutions Inc, Herbalife Ltd,
Evercore Inc. The 10th company is Google’s parent company
Alphabet Inc. which was created in 2015 and there are no
reported illegal insider trading cases so far. All publicly
available time series stock volume data for Alphabet is
selected and used for validating the anomalous patterns to
see whether any window from Alphabet Inc. matches with
any of the anomalous patterns that we explored in our
experiments. We used the transaction volume data feature
as we found that transaction volume fluctuates more than
any other available features. Furthermore, we transformed
the transaction volume data into a percentage of change with
respect to the starting day of the window or sequence for
better interpretability of the result. For example, if first three
days of a window (of size 50 days) has transaction volumes
of 100, 120 and 115, then the actual data that is fed in to
the neural network is 0, .20, and .15 (i.e., the percentage
change with respect to 100, which is the transaction volume
of day 1 for the current window).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The following sections represent the experimental steps
corresponding to our proposed architecture presented in
Figure 1 along with results.
A. Litigation Classification and Visual Analytics
Our first experiment is preprocessing a huge number of
unstructured text data using combined Natural Language
Processing (NLP) and Decision Tree-based approach. And
its main purpose is to aid an analyst’s understanding of the
data. Our first attempt was to finding discriminant features
from the text that helps to distinguish insider trading cases
from the case archive. It is necessary to point out that,
initially we label all cases as insider cases that have the
insider keyword in the title or body of the case. We tokenize
all the cases and make the feature vector (a matrix where
the columns contain the features/tokens and the rows contain
the case wise token/feature frequencies). Later we run the
Extra Trees algorithm to rank the features. The Extra Trees
(ET) algorithm, also known by the term Extremely Random-
ized Trees, is an ensemble tree-based approach where the
randomness goes further compared to the Random Forest
algorithm [18]. Here the splitting attribute is also chosen
in an extremely random manner in terms of both variable
index and splitting value so as to randomize the tree, whose
structure has no relation with the learning samples [19].
Furthermore, the Extremely Randomized Trees algorithm
has shown positive results in some fraud/anomaly detection
research [19], [20] using public datasets. We set the biased
parameter of the ET algorithm to maximum so that it gives
more priority to correctly classifying the insider cases as
opposed to the non-insider class. Some of the discriminant
features that we found from it are as follows: insider, insid-
ers, friend, classmate, non-public, linked, etc. We also run
TF-IDF to find the features that are uncommonly common
in the cases. Also, given that calculating TF-IDF requires a
substantial amount of memory for the size of the data set.
We used the Apache Spark tool where we can distribute
the work to multiple commodity machines and gather the
result back to the master node for returning the accumulated
result. This tool also allows us to create a data frame (data
container) whereby if the data size is more than the capacity
of RAM, disk is used to hold the remaining data. Thus, we
can use a single commodity machine (with 12GB RAM and
a core i7 processor) for this experiment when the processing
time is not a major concern. But this is easily scalable to
multiple nodes with the help of Apache Spark when the
feature vector for TF-IDF is large and/or faster processing
is a major concern. Almost all of the top results from the TF-
IDF algorithm only returned human names as being the most
useful feature, rather than important illegal insider trading
keywords that were found to be the most useful features by
the Extra Trees algorithm. Thus, we only kept the features
identified by the ET algorithms, discarding all other features
that have a feature rank of zero (i.e., no contribution in the
classification process—zero information gain). After that, we
made a new feature vector with the filtered features (i.e.,
reduces features) which were smaller than before and easily
usable on a commodity laptop. We use the decision tree
algorithm on the processed data (i.e., reduced feature vector)
from litigation cases and visualize the important textual
features and their relations in terms of nodes and edges of
the tree. This helps analyst to understand the importance
of the insider cases, parties involved, etc. The developed
model can also be used to classify new unlabeled cases or
news article from other sources for insider vs other case
classification. We hope to include more data sources in our
future work on this. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show portions
Figure 2. A portion from the top of the decision tree showing the decision
path.
Figure 3. A portion from the middle of the decision tree showing the
decision path.
of the tree generated by running the decision tree algorithm
on the reduced features. The features (1526 features) were
selected using Extra Trees Algorithms. Examining the tree,
we can see that the features such as insider and its variants
(e.g., insiders) of non-public, friend, proposed, trial, etc.,
play a key role in decision making. These features can be
found in the upper section of the ranked features list. From
the analysis, we also found that in most of the cases, the
information was leaked by friends, colleagues, and relatives
in their social or work life. The blue color nodes represent
the insider class, the brown color nodes represent the non-
insider class, and the white color node (can be insider or non-
insider class) represents the decision path for a particular
sample. In short, the decision tree acts as a filter (or funnel)
for narrowing down the possible number of litigation cases
that would need to be considered by a fraud analyst. In
addition, from these discovered cases, illegal insider trading
patterns can be generated for classification of future cases.
The top-ranked features from TF-IDF are mostly human
names: Donovan, Abe, Patel, Steffes, and Keith. However,
unfortunately we do not have any more information on
these individuals. In the future, we want to investigate the
incorporation of other data sources, like social media, that
would provide more insight as to what transpired.
B. Predicting Company Wise Stock Transaction Volume
For predicting stock volume, we used the deep learning
technique LSTM RNN with the help of Tensorflow in the
back-end and Keras as a wrapper. The input layer consists
of 50 neurons which correspond to the window size. In
other words, each neuron is fed with the stock volume for
a day. This input layer is then fed into an LSTM layer
of 50 neurons which is connected to another LSTM layer
of 100 neurons. The last LSTM layer is connected to a
fully connected normal layer of 1 neuron with a linear
activation function. This activation function is used to give
the prediction for the next time step. Other configurations
for this experiment are: dropout = .2, loss = mse, optimize=
rmsprop, epoch = 1, and batch size = 512. The rmsprop
optimizer divides the learning rate for a weight by using a
running average (i.e., average changes/updates continually
as new data points collected) of recent gradients for that
weight. To recall, we applied LSTM RNN in three different
Figure 4. Window-based prediction.
ways. Figure 4 is a visualization of the window based
prediction method where for the prediction of window w,
only window w-1 is used. The x-axis represents the time
series. Here we have two-time series each consisting of 50
days. And the Y-axis represents the percentage of change
in stock transaction volume from the starting day of the
window which means that the Y value of the starting day
of any window will be zero. Furthermore, Figure 5 is the
visualization of day based prediction where all previous days
in the window are considered for making a prediction for
the next day, and the knowledge base is updated after each
day with the true observation. Figure 6 is the visualization
of a sequence-based prediction where entire history (all
windows) is considered while making a prediction. After
Figure 5. Day based prediction.
Figure 6. Whole history-based prediction.
the stock transaction volume prediction has been completed,
we then forward the predicted data (i.e., output from LSTM
RNN) to ANOMALOUS algorithm for anomaly detection as
a multidimensional array. The output from LSTM RNN is
three discrete signals for the three different ways we applied
the LSTM RNN.
C. Anomaly Detection and Prediction
Our last experiment is to apply our proposed ANOMA-
LOUS algorithm for comparing different discrete signals.
In this stage, we wrote a Matlab script to implement the
algorithm. For the comparison of discrete signals, we used
the Normalized Cross Correlation (NCC). The Correlation
indicates the similarity of signals and is widely used in
various applications (e.g., speech recognition) for signal
comparisons. In this setting, we are using a normalized
version of Matlabs cross-correlation rather than the standard
version of cross-correlation because we need to know the
similarity between signals of different time series (i.e.,
different minimum and maximum values) in the same scale
(-1 to 1). The formula for the cross-correlation is:
Corrx,y =
N−1∑
n=0
x[n]y[n] (1)
For our experiments, x and y are the vectors of time series
data consisting of the stock transaction volume of a defined
consecutive number of days (i.e., the window), where N
represents the number of days in the series. Thus, the cross-
correlation (Corr) is simply the sum of the scalar multiple of
corresponding elements of two signals or time series, where
the higher the value the more they are correlated or similar.
But the companies in comparison have transaction volume
of different ranges (e.g., maximum transaction volume for
Wells Fargo is 254,575,800 whereas for Evercore Inc. it
is only 4,345,100). Since the signals being compared have
different energy levels or aptitudes values, we applied a
normalized version of cross-correlation (NCC) that converts
those into the same scale first and then calculates the
correlation. The Normalized Cross Correlation (NCC) is
formulated as follows:
Corr-normx,y =
∑N−1
n=0 x[n]y[n]√
(
∑N−1
n=0 x[n]x[n]
∑N−1
n=0 y[n]y[n])
(2)
Here the nominator part is exactly the same as before
(Formula 1) which is scaled using the factor of the energy
level of both participating signals for the purpose of normal-
ization. In Matlab, it is available as a built-in feature and
named as xcorr. To apply the normalize option, we need to
pass the parameter coeff along with the parameters of the
signal.
Figure 8 tells us that the two time series from Figure 7
are most similar at day lag -7 (position of the spike) with
a correlation value of .661. Since the maximum value of
correlation is 1 (when they are exactly the same), this value
of .667 tells us that they are not that similar. If we want to
get the actual day when the value of NCR is the highest in
the chart (e.g., Figure 7), we can use our formulated equation
(3) by observing the data:
day = window size+ (w ∗ window size) + d (3)
For our experiment, the window size = 50. The value of w
and d are mentioned on the top of the figure (Figures 7-12),
p tells the pattern number in comparison. For example, the
calculation of the day where the NCR is highest from Figure
7 using equation 3 is as follows: day = 50 + (2 * 50) + 10
Figure 7. An anomalous time series (window-based).
Figure 8. NCR (window-based).
= 160. So it is the 160th day in respect to the beginning
of the entire time series.
From Figure 9, it is clearly visible that the predicted
result is almost similar to the actual result. Figure 10 is the
correlation between the above signals in Figure 9, which
tells us that the time series or signals are almost similar at
day lag 1 with a correlation value of .989. Here day lag 1
means if we shift the actual signal right by 1 day then it
will give us a correlation value of .989 that we got.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 are the visualizations and corre-
lations of the entire time series based prediction. However,
while the results seem promising, we are only using a small
set of windows. In the future, we plan on experimenting with
longer runs where the number of windows increases with
more data points —that will also help us to better understand
the gap between some of the peaks of the actual and
predicted data. Because it is difficult to predict time series
data with traditional prominent machine learning approaches
Figure 9. An anomalous time series (day based).
Figure 10. NCR (day based).
(e.g., SVM), these initial experiments indicate potentially
good results can be realized using a deep learning based
technique like LSTM RNN especially within our proposed
framework where we can control how much information we
want to use for better predictions (e.g., for window based
prediction, just the previous window is used for predicting
next window).
Finally, Figure 13 and Table I show the comparison
of three variants of LSTM RNN that we applied in our
experiments. First, the day-based prediction approach out-
performs other approaches as it is capable of detecting all
anomalous patterns with the highest hit count. Day-based
prediction performs better because it uses the true history of
all previous days for that window. But the limitation of this
approach is that the number of days that it can predict in
advance is only one. On the other hand, the window-based
prediction approach predicts a whole window (50 days)
in advance based on the previous window, so it performs
Figure 11. An anomalous time series (whole history based).
Figure 12. NCR (whole history based).
a little worse than the day-based prediction. Finally, the
entire history-based prediction approach performs the worst
as it does the prediction using the entire historical data set,
which is impractical for time series prediction. Furthermore,
Table I shows pattern-wise results (grouped by methods) for
discovering the anomalous patterns. The first two patterns
(pattern 1 and 2) are detected in all of the companies
multiple times in the whole time series. But the actual illegal
insider trading case was just for two different companies in
two different time spans. So our approach identifies several
suspicious time series whose actual nature may not only be
illegal insider trading, but could consist of other potential
financial fraud situations. However, there may also be false
positives. One possibility to mitigating the false positives is
to increase the NCR correlation threshold (currently set to
.80), but that will also result in losing some of the anomalous
patterns.
To validate how good indicator are those anomalous
patterns, we also run our experiment on Google’s parent
Table I
PATTERN WISE HIT
Pattern % Companies Total hit Window Day History
1 100% 74 8 66 0
2 100% 128 116 8 4
3 28.57% 5 0 5 0
4 57.14% 4 0 4 0
5 71.42% 76 11 65 0
6 28.57% 10 1 9 0
7 14.29% 1 0 1 0
8 14.29% 4 0 4 0
9 14.29% 1 0 1 0
10 14.29% 1 0 1 0
11 14.29% 1 0 1 0
Figure 13. Performance of different approaches.
company Alphabet Inc. which was created in 2015 and there
are no reported illegal insider trading cases so far. We find
that with a correlation coefficient of .94 and above there is
no available anomalous pattern. When we reduce the value
below to .94, several time-spans are marked as similar with
the anomalous patterns (illegal insider trading time series)
that we have identified from the historical data as actual
insider trading cases.
Predicting illegal insider trading correctly is almost a
nightmare like predicting stock market price correctly. What
we can do is make an educated guess using different scien-
tific approaches. If a time series is identified as suspicious
then it can be a result of something legal or illegal. If it is
illegal then it can be any type of fraud activities. As we
trained the model using some true illegal insider trading
pattern so there is a good chance that our model’s prediction
can be an actual illegal insider trading. Taking measures
proactively using our approach can mitigate damage in
the market before the official news of the illegal insider
trading is released. After all, the insider may be aware of
familiar insider trading patterns and might want to evade the
detection. This is a known limitation of our dataset, and in
the future we will try to integrate more data sources (e.g.,
social media) to tackle this issue.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented how to predict and detect
illegal insider trading proactively (before the official news is
released) by analyzing heterogeneous sources of structured
and unstructured data. We also showed an effective way
(i.e., tree-based visualizations) to intuitively represent the
unstructured data to the analyst for better understanding and
a possible reduction of the search space. We targeted com-
panies that were identified by our tree-based visualizations
and also identified as prominent illegal-insider trading cases
by the SEC. For the targeted companies, from the parsed
litigation and historical stock data, we discovered the illegal
insider trading patterns (anomalous pattern). Later we used
LSTM RNN to predict the stock transaction volume using
three approaches. After that, we used our proposed algorithm
to see whether any of the time spans (actual or predicted)
match with the discovered anomalous patterns. We found
that our algorithm has a good success rate in detecting an
anomalous pattern from both the affected and non-affected
companies. One limitation of this research is that we were
not able to compare our result with any similar state-of-the-
art work because our work is the first work (to best of our
knowledge) in detecting specifically illegal insider trading
from true litigation cases.
A future direction of this research is trying the prediction
and detection part with a larger number of companies to see
its effectiveness. In addition, test and compare the prediction
part of this work with some other algorithms (e.g., GAM,
ARIMA) that work well with time series prediction.
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